ConnectWise Cloud Backup breach warning graphic with a red alert triangle

ConnectWise Cloud Backup Breach: How Attackers Skipped MFA and Targeted 2,250 Microsoft 365 Tenants

The ConnectWise Cloud Backup breach let attackers sign in to Microsoft 365 tenants as a trusted backup app, so MFA never got a chance to stop them. If your company, or the IT provider that manages it, ever used ConnectWise Cloud Backup (the product formerly known as SkyKick), check your tenant this week.

Microsoft says the problem did not come from a flaw in its own products. The weak link was a stolen credential for a third-party app that customers had already approved.

Here are the quick facts before we get into the details.

  • Microsoft published its findings on October 21, 2026 and blames a China-aligned group it tracks as Storm-0940.
  • More than 2,250 Microsoft 365 tenants were targeted, according to CSO Online.
  • ConnectWise suspended Cloud Backup and related services on October 17.
  • Targeting is not the same as a breach: most attempts failed, and a sign-in alone doesn’t prove data was taken.

Treat that last point as good news with a catch. Some victims did end up with attacker-created backdoors inside their directory.

What happened in the ConnectWise Cloud Backup breach

Storm-0940 got hold of a credential belonging to ConnectWise cloud applications. It then used that credential to authenticate to customer tenants that had already consented to the app.

The attackers ran an AI framework called ARTEX, an open-source multi-agent tool built for automated penetration testing. Microsoft says it has seen ARTEX used since at least September 2026, and sign-in attempts ran at about 2,900 per minute.

In some cases the group reached privileged cloud access in under three hours. Here’s the rough timeline reported so far.

Date (2026) What happened
Oct 10-14 A password-spray campaign hit 327 accounts at eight organizations. It produced over 151,000 failed sign-ins and no successful ones, per Tech Times.
Oct 15 Attackers switch to the stolen ConnectWise app credential and move through downstream tenants.
Oct 16 ConnectWise publishes its first advisory.
Oct 17 ConnectWise suspends Cloud Backup, SaaS Security and Cloud Management and disables seven app identities.
Oct 21 Microsoft publishes its threat intelligence write-up.

The table above matters because it shows how fast this went. The window between the first app-based sign-ins and the vendor shutting things down was only a couple of days.

Why MFA didn’t stop the attack

Multi-factor authentication protects people signing in. This attack never used a person.

The ConnectWise app signs in with its own credential, so there is no user prompt to approve. And because each customer had pre-consented to the app during setup, access worked across every tenant that had installed it.

Tech Times reports the app held broad permissions, including Directory.ReadWrite.All. That one permission lets an app read and change users, groups and roles, which is exactly what the attackers did next.

What the attackers did inside tenants

Once in, the AI agents moved fast through Microsoft Graph and directory operations. Microsoft lists three main moves.

  • Reconnaissance of users, groups and roles.
  • Adding new credentials to applications so they could return later.
  • Changing identities, groups and privileged roles.

Microsoft warns these changes “can remain active as a backdoor” even after the original app is dealt with. Tech Times adds that in about 50 tenants, ConnectWise service principals held directory roles, mostly Exchange Administrator, and that attacker-added secrets were set to expire in 2028.

So switching the ConnectWise app off is only step one. If attackers planted keys on other apps, those keep working.

How to check your Microsoft 365 tenant

If you’re an admin, follow Microsoft’s guidance in this order.

  1. Keep ConnectWise connections disabled until ConnectWise issues restoration instructions.
  2. Don’t delete the enterprise apps. Deleting destroys evidence you may need.
  3. Search Entra by application ID, not display name. The four IDs are in Microsoft’s post.
  4. Review service principal sign-ins from October 15 back to October 1 if your logs go that far.
  5. Audit Entra logs for new credentials, new role assignments, and changes to Conditional Access.

Preserve your Entra, Purview and SIEM logs before you change anything. Microsoft also published Defender XDR detection rules for this activity.

If you’re not an admin, ask your IT team or managed service provider one direct question: “Did we ever use ConnectWise Cloud Backup or SkyKick, and have you checked?” For more on tightening up after a vendor incident, see our guide to rotating secrets after a breach.

Why this breach points to a bigger problem

Plenty of companies guard their user logins carefully and then hand a backup or security vendor an app with wide-open permissions. That’s the gap here.

It also fits a pattern we’ve covered before. Our post on the Norforge AI agent hacking campaign showed how cheap automated attacks have become, and ARTEX is another example of agents doing the grunt work.

The long-term fixes are boring but effective: give vendor apps the least permissions they need, remove Directory.ReadWrite.All where it isn’t needed, and watch for new app credentials.

Frequently Asked Questions

Was Microsoft 365 itself hacked?

No. Microsoft says the activity did not come from a compromise of, or a vulnerability in, its own systems. The attackers abused a third-party app that customers had authorized.

Does enabling MFA protect me from this?

Not against this method. App-only sign-ins use the app’s own credential, so there’s no user MFA prompt to challenge. Limiting app permissions and monitoring service principals is what helps.

Were 2,250 tenants actually breached?

No, that’s the number targeted. Tech Times reports Huntress confirmed unauthorized access in about 300 tenants out of nearly 1,000 that showed attacker activity.

Should I delete the ConnectWise app from Entra?

Not as a first step. Microsoft advises keeping the connection disabled and preserving evidence, and deleting the app can erase logs you need for an investigation.

Who is most at risk?

Organizations that use or once used ConnectWise Cloud Backup for Microsoft 365, including customers of managed service providers that deployed it for them.

Our take: check first, assume nothing

Don’t wait for a notice that may never come. If there’s any chance your tenant ever touched ConnectWise or SkyKick, have an admin search for those app IDs today and review service principal changes since early October. If you’re a small business, push your IT provider for a written answer, because the cleanup of planted credentials is the part people miss.


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