The Optimizely supply chain attack put malicious code on the websites of Zoom, BBC, CNN, GitLab and dozens of other big brands on November 16. If you visited one of them that day, the code could have swapped crypto addresses, skimmed card details or tried to hack your iPhone. Most of the damage was cleaned up within hours, but a few checks are still worth doing today.
Here is the short version, then the details and a plain checklist.
Quick facts first, so you can decide how worried to be.
- 178 organizations were hit through 188 infected Optimizely scripts, out of 1,611 that researchers checked.
- The attack ran on November 16; only one infected script remained by 21:52 UTC that evening.
- The payload targeted crypto transfers, card forms, cookies and iPhones running older iOS versions.
- About $7,040 landed in attacker wallets within roughly nine hours.
- Optimizely had not published a statement or explained the root cause when the first reports went out.
That list is a snapshot of day one, so the numbers may grow as more sites are checked.
What the Optimizely supply chain attack actually did
Optimizely sells website experimentation tools. Customers load a small JavaScript file from Optimizely’s servers, and that file runs on every visitor’s browser. Someone figured out how to add their own code to those files.
Security researcher Scott Helme of Report URI found the problem and published a detailed write-up on November 16. According to BleepingComputer, which confirmed the malicious scripts loading on several of the named sites, the infected code pulled a second script from a domain ending in .cc.
The trick worked because the files still came from Optimizely’s own content delivery network with a valid certificate. A site that trusted Optimizely had no obvious warning sign. Helme’s team says the CDN served exactly what it was given, so this was not a cache-poisoning attack.
How the attacker got write access to so many unrelated customer projects is still unanswered. Helme says that is for Optimizely to explain, and neither report included a company statement.
Which sites were hit, and how fast it spread
The affected list reads like a directory of well-known brands. BleepingComputer confirmed malicious scripts loading, or trying to load, on Zoom, CNN, Fox News, BBC, Salesforce, GitLab, KLM, Air France, American Eagle, Bitly and UNICEF USA, among others. Helme’s write-up adds names such as IKEA, HSBC and Equifax.
The timeline below comes from Helme’s write-up. All times are UTC on November 16.
| Time (UTC) | What happened |
|---|---|
| 04:21 | First Optimizely injection seen, on a BBC script |
| 08:10 | First build of the crypto-swapping script |
| 13:43 | Card skimmer added to the payload |
| 17:13 to 17:57 | iPhone exploit loaders added |
| 20:40 to 21:10 | Mass clean-up begins on several affected sites |
| 21:52 | One of the 188 scripts still infected |
The attacker rebuilt the payload 26 times in a single day, adding features and wallets without removing any. That pace suggests a person actively tuning the attack, not a one-off drop.
What the malware tried to steal from you
The payload was a multi-purpose kit rather than a single trick. Helme’s analysis lists four jobs.
- Crypto address swapping: it replaced wallet addresses on the page, in the clipboard and in outgoing requests, covering Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana and several other coins.
- Card skimming: it grabbed the number, expiry date and security code typed into a site’s own forms.
- Cookie and screenshot theft: it sent back page URLs, cookies that lack the HttpOnly flag, and screenshots when wallet or payment wording appeared.
- iPhone exploit kits: it loaded the Coruna and DarkSword kits in a hidden frame on older iOS versions.
Cards entered inside a hosted payment frame, such as the ones many checkouts embed from a payment provider, were out of the script’s reach. That limits the card risk to sites that collect card details directly on their own pages.
Coruna targeted iOS 13 through 17, and DarkSword targeted iOS 18.x. Pages reloaded every 60 seconds on iOS 18.6 and earlier to keep retrying. Exploit kits like these are a big reason to keep installing iOS security updates the day they land.
If you visited an affected site on November 16
Most people will need only a few minutes. Work through this short list in order.
- Update your iPhone or iPad to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later, which is the advice in Helme’s write-up.
- Check your card statements if you paid by card on one of the affected sites that day.
- Double-check any crypto address before you confirm a transfer, because the pasted address may not be the one you copied.
None of this means your data was stolen. It means the window was open for roughly a day, and a quick statement check is cheap insurance.
If you run Optimizely: what to audit now
Site owners have the harder job, because you cannot assume your own copy is clean just because the attack looks over. Helme recommends searching your Project JavaScript and experiment code for the string 1688360.cc, for atob( and for any script you do not recognize.
Then review who and what can write to your Optimizely projects, including users, API tokens and integrations, and rotate the credentials. Our guide to rotating API keys after a breach walks through that routine. Treat card data typed on your own forms on November 16 as potentially exposed, and consider whether customers need to be told.
A Content Security Policy is your best long-term guard. Helme crawled affected hosts and compared the results.
| CSP result | Organizations |
|---|---|
| No Content Security Policy at all | 68 |
| Policy let the payload run and steal data | 50 |
| Payload ran, but data theft was blocked | 17 |
| Payload blocked completely | 24 |
The write-up says a restrictive script-src made the difference, and warns that strict-dynamic and unsafe-eval can let this kind of attack through. A tight connect-src rule also stops stolen data from leaving the page.
Why one script can sink hundreds of sites
Every third-party script on a page runs with the same power as the site’s own code. When a vendor’s account or pipeline is compromised, that power moves to the attacker, and every customer inherits the problem at once.
This is the same pattern we covered when attackers turned security patches into exploits: speed matters more than novelty. Defenders who watch their third-party scripts for changes spot trouble in hours, not weeks.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is the Optimizely supply chain attack still going on?
Cleanup moved fast. Helme reported only one of 188 infected scripts left at 21:52 UTC on November 16. Researchers say the real number of affected organizations could be higher than the 178 they found.
Was my credit card stolen?
Only if you typed card details directly into a page that carried the skimmer. Cards entered inside a hosted payment frame were out of reach. Review your statement for November 16 to be sure.
Do I need to change my passwords?
Helme’s advice for visitors does not include password changes. Site owners, though, should treat cookies that lack the HttpOnly flag as exposed and rotate any session tokens.
Which iPhones were at risk?
The exploit kits covered iOS 13 through 18.x, with 18.6 and earlier the main target for repeated attempts. Updating to iOS 18.7.3 or iOS 26.3 or later closes that door, per the research write-up.
The takeaway: audit your scripts this week
If you run a website, make a list of every third-party script on your checkout and login pages today, and ask whether each one really needs to be there. If you are just a visitor, update your iPhone, glance at Monday’s card charges, and move on. This one looks contained, but the same kind of attack will come back through a different vendor.


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